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NOTES ON RECENT
MISSOURI CASES
INSURANCE AGENCY-RIGHT OF AN AGENT TO RENEWAL COMMISSIONS. Locher v. New York Life Ins. Co.! Plaintiff
was employed by defendant to solicit life insurance under a contract,
which in the beginning covered a period of one year, but which was
thereafter renewed from year to year. Defendant agreed to pay plaintiff as compensation for his services, among other things, commissions
on all renewal premiums, paid on account of policies originally procured
by plaintiff for a stated number of years after the writing of the policies. Plaintiff breached the agreement, and was accordingly discharged.
After his dismissal, certain renewal premiums were paid on policies that
he had originally secured for defendant, and he claimed a right to commissions on these premiums in spite of the fact that his agreement had
been terminated as a result of his wrongful conduct and breach of the
same. The St. Louis Court of Appeals denied plaintiff's right to recover, basing its decision on the fact that the contract expressly limited
the obligation to pay the commissions to such time as the contract should
1. (1919)
S. W. 862.
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be in force and operation. The court also intimated by way of dictum
that renewal commissions, falling due after the ending of the employment ought not as rule to be recovered, even tho the contract is silent on
this point. It was suggested that the parties could not be supposed to
have intended that commissions should continue to come to the agent
after he has ceased to act in such capacity.!
There can be no question as to the soundness of the actual decision
in the case. If the agreement was that the commissions should cease
with the agency, there was no possible basis for plaintiff's recovery.'
But the dictum in the case apparently generalizes, and lays down a
broad rule, and for this reason would seem to be worthy of some consideration.
An agent might sue for commissions accruing after the ending of
his agency either under a contract employing him at will, or under one
that employed him for a specified length of time. If the contract is of
the last mentioned type, it is possible that it might have come to an end
in one of the following ways: by its own terms (i. e. by the lapse of the
time specified), by the rightful discharge of the agent, or by the wrongful discharge of the agent. In the case of the rightful discharge of the
agent, the discharge might have been due to no deliberate breach of the
contract on his part, but to an unforeseen incapacity arising, which prevented his doing the work required of him under the agreement. It is
proposed to discuss the cases falling within the various assumptions,
where the contract is silent as to the effect of the ending of the agency
2. The extent of the dictum is rather obscure; the court, however, does intimate that if the contract of agency -is
one at will that under those conditions
the agent might perhaps have a right
to collect commissions that fall due after
the termination of the employment. 208
S. W. 862, 1. c. 867. Aside from this
possible exception the court seems to
feel that an agent ought not to recover commissions accruing after the ending of the agency. "The courts in construing agreements like the one we have
before us, proceed on the notion that
the compensaticn to be received by the
agent from year to year thru commissions on renewal premiums, is associated with the continuance of his agency
and is partly earned by services subsequent to the procurement of the risk,

not solely by its procurement; the purpose being to bind him to steady work
in behalf of the company." 208 S. W.
1. c. 865.
"The authorities are overwhelming that such provisions, standing alone, deprive the agent of any
right to commissions on renewal premiums paid after the termination of the
agency." id.
3. It would seem that the court might
well have decided the case also on the
ground that the defendant had delib.
erately breached his contract of employment by entering the employ of a rival
during the period covered by his contract with defendant; 208 S. W. 1. c.
865. This would have been an easy way
to have disposed of the case. See note
9 infra.
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on the right to renewal commissions, and to determine the state of the
law governing in each instance.'
It has been held that where the contract of employment is one at
will, the agent has a right to renewal commissions that fall due after
the termination of the agency.' It was said that the commission is
earned as soon as the policy is written, time of payment alone being postponed until the renewal premium is paid, and made contingent on this
last event; that the commission is analogous to salary earned by securing the policy. Under this line of decisions, continuation of the agent
in the employ of the company has nothing to do with the right to the
commission; that depends alone on the payment of the renewal premium.
If the contract can be ended at the will of the employer, a construction of this kind seems to be reasonable. It is hardly proper to
assume that the agent would stipulate for the payment of commissions at
a future date, which might well fall beyond the period of the agency, if
the obligation to pay the same was to depend on the existence of the
agency at the time of payment. Such a stipulation would amount to
no obligation at all being assumed by the principal, because he would be
free to escali it by discharging the agent without incurring any liability
of any kind. For this reason it is believed that the agent has a right
to the commissions under this state of facts. It is urged that the parties
must have intended that the commissions should be paid regardless of
the continued existence of the agency, for if they did not intend this,
then the agent was bargaining not for a contractual right, but for a
right depending merely on the good will of his employer.'
4. This note is not concerned with
cases where there is an express provision that the commissions shall either
cease with the ending of the agency, or
continue after that event; as has already been suggested the express provision of the contract, if there is one,
will control. The problem presented for
analysis is the soundness of the following quotation taken from the case
under discussion: "The right of an agent
to commissions on renewals collected, or
falling in after the end of his agency,
can rest only on express terms in his
contract, or be necessarily drawn from
'an interpretation of that contract as a
whole." 208 S. W. 1. c. 866.
5. Hercules etc. Soc. v. Brinker
(1879) 77 N. Y. 435 (the decision of

the New York Court of Appeals, in this
case is a reversal' of the decision of the
court below without opinion; the lower
court had denied the agent's rights to
renewal commissions after the terminationof the employment. For this reason the case is unsatisfactory); Heyn
v. Ar.Y. etc. Co. (1908) 192 N. Y. 1, 84
N. E. 725. Mich. etc. Co. v. Coleman
(1907) 118 Tenn. 215, 100 S. W. 122, 1.
c. 127. In the case last cited it was
said: "The agent's commissions on first
premiums and his percentage on renewal premiums are both regarded in the
light of compensation to him for his
services in obtaining policies for the
company and thereby building up its
business."
6. "This (i. e. a construction other
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The rule permitting the agent to recover as above stated is not universal, and there are some decisions, and some dicta to the effect that
the agent cannot get commissions that accrue after the end of the agency.!
This holding is usually based on the ground that it was not the intention of the parties that the principle should continue liable to pay the
commissions after the agent has left his employ.
The courts that
hold this way seem to feel that it is hardly conceivable that a principal
would be willing to continue paying commissions under such conditions.'
Where the contract is for a stated period, and that period has expired, the situation ought to be dealt with in the same way as the situation in a case where the employment is at will and has been ended. The
agent should have a right to commissions on renewal premiums paid
after the termination of the agency. That must have been the intention of the parties, and what the agent bargained for. If he did not
do this, then he was not bargaining for money, but for money if his employer wanted to retain him in his employ, and he wanted to remain in it.
than that urged by the writer) would be
a harsh, and unjust construction of the
contract, and would place the plaintiff
at the mercy of the defendant." Heyn v.
Ins. Co. note ! supra.
7. Fidelity etc. Co. v. Washington
etc. Co. (dictum) (1912) 193 Fed. 512;
Scott v. Travelers' etc. Co. (dictum)
(1906)
103 Md. 69, 63 Atl. 377; Andrews v. Trazelers' etc. Co. (1902) 24
Ky. L. R. 844, 70 S. W. 43; King v.
Raleigh (dictum) (1903)
100 Mo. App.
1, 70 S. W. 251. It is doubtful whether the statement in this case ought to
be characterized as standing for the proposition that an agent cannot where the
contract is silent in this respect recover
commissions that accrue after the end of
the agency. The contract in this case
expressly provided
against any
such
right, and it appears to the writer that
what the court said about an agent's
having no rights to the commissions is
to be confined to the cases where there
is such a provision against the same.
Ballard v. Travelers' etc. Co. (1896) 119
N. C. 187, 25 S. E. 956; North Carolina etc. Co. v. Williams (1884) 91 N.
C. 69, 49 Am. Rep. 636.
8. Sometimes there are other reasons
given for the denial of the right. It has

been said that the commissions are compensation associated with the continuance of the agency, and are partly earned by services subsequent to the procurement of the risk. See to this effect King
v. Raleigh and North Carolina etc. Co.
v. Williams, supra, note 7. See also
note 2.
It has also been said that the agent
cannot recover the commissions for the
reason that his power is not coupled
with an interest. This was said in the
case under review and also in Ballard v.
Travelers' etc. Co. and in North Carolina etc. Co. v. Williams, supra, note 7.
It would seem to be entirely obvious
that there is no power coupled with an
interest in a case of this kind, but that
does not settle the matter one way or
another. If the commissions are the
equivalent of salary earned when the
policies are written then they are due
regardless of whether or no the agency
is revocable or not. See Mich. etc. Co.
v. Coleman, supra, note 5. There the
court admitted that there was no power coupled with an interest, hut nevertheless held that the commissions were
recoverable on the theory last mentioned.
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So far as is known there are no cases that deal with this exact situation,
but the opinion is hazarded that an agent would be permitted to recover the commissions if the court to which the question was presented
approved of the decisions that allow commissions to an agent in a case
of an employment at will. But if the court did not approve of those
holdings, the agent's recovery would be denied.
Where the employer ends the agency by discharging the agent for
cause, there is no right to commissions that accrue thereafter, if the
breach of the agreement by the agent has been due to his deliberate default.' It does not make any difference that the agent would have had
a right to such commissions if he had not been discharged, because the
right to the same depends on the contract's being alive; the agent has
by his breach made it possible for the principal to rescind the same
rightfully, and for this reason the agent is not in a position to assert
his right. After all, the agent is obligated to perform his side of the
agreement for the principal, and this performance is the compensation
that the latter is to get for the payment of the later accruing commissions, and if this compensation is not received, it is but just that the
agent should be denied all further rights under the contract. No man,
who is substantially in default ought to be permitted to sue on his contract."
It has been suggested that it might happen that the agent's services
might be dispensed with by the principal for a cause not due to an intentional default on the part of the former. Suppose that the agent becomes sick, ought he under these conditions to lose his right to renewal
commissions falling due after this event? Or to take an analogous case,
suppose that the agent dies, ought his estate to lose the commissions?
These questions are practically of first impression so far as the rights of
insurance agents are concerned, but there are rules that are fairly well
developed in the field of master and servant, which ought to furnish a
9. Burleson v. Northwestern etc. Co.
(1890) 86 Cal. 342, 24 Pac. 1064; Phoenix etc. Co. v. Halloway (1883) 51 Conn.
310;
Frankel v. Mich. etc. Co. (1901)
158 Ind. 304, 62 N. E. 703; Armstrong
v. National etc. Co. (1908) 112 S. W.
(Tex.) 327; Walker v. John Hancock
etc. Co. (1910) 80 N. J. Law 342, 79
Atl. 354.
10. Hale v. Brooklyn etc. Co. (1890)
120 N. Y. 294, 24 N. E. 317, might be
interpreted as a decision contra to the
generally prevailing rule, given above.
In that case the agent severed his con-

nection with the company during the
term of the contract with the consent of
the latter, and the court held that unless
the company proved that the agent's resignation involved his releasing the company from its obligation to pay after
accruing renewal commissions that the
agent could recover them. It might be
suggested that the acceptance of the
agent's resignation amounted to a rescission of the agreement, and as a result
the agent's contractual rights of all kinds
were wiped out. The court rejected this
notion.
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working analogy, if the commissions are to be regarded as the equiva-

lant of salary earned when the policy is written, in which light it is
deemed they should be regarded.
If a servant agrees to work for his master for a definite time, and
the salary, or wages for the work to be done, is to be paid in a lump
sum at the end of the term, and the servant is incapacitated thru unforeseeable illness to complete the work, it is held that there can be no recovery from the master upon the contract for the work that he has done.
The reason for this is that the agreement is entire and not severable. If
this is the case no wages are due the servant until the whole of the work
bargained for has been furnished to the master, and consequently all
relief under the contract must be denied the servant. The master's obligation to pay is conditional on the servant's performing all the work,
and of course the rule would be the same where the failure to per1
A
form by the servant was due to his death instead of to his illness.
decision of tiis kind, while it seems hard on the servant, is right and
is consistent with contract law. A court has no right to divide an en-

tire promise, and to say that it shall be proportionally performed for
part performance by the promisee.
It does not follow from this, however, that the servant under the
assumed factS would have no relief at all, and it might well be that he
would have a right to sue in quasi-contract for the value of the services that he has actually rendered, or if he is dead that his estate would
have such a right. There has been some benefit conferred on the master,
and if the value of that exceeds the damage that has resulted from the
servant's inability to finish his work, it would be just to allow a recovery to this extent. There are cases that would permit a recovery
along these lines, and they are just and proper." The only possible objection to permitting a recovery would be that the servant is in default,
but this is due to his misfortune, and therefore ought not to preclude
the giving of relief in an action where equitable principles are applicable,
and in the face of the further fact that there has been actual benefit conferred on the master. It seems needless to say that the rule as above
Cutter v. Powell (1795) 6 T. R.
See also Helm v. Wilson (1835) 4

apportioned, and the servant, who had
become ill could recover on the con-

Mo. 41, 1. c. 46. "We hold the law to
be, that where there is a special agreement the party who is to execute it

tract for the work that he had actually
performed prior to his illness.
12. Fuller v. Brown (1845) 11 Met.
(Mass.) 440; Wolfe v. Howes (1859) 20

11.

320.

must do so before he can recover anything." But see contra Green v. Linton (1838) 7 Porter (Ala.) 133, 31 Am.

Dec. 707, where the court in a case of
this kind held that the promise to pay
wages at the end of the term could be

N. Y. 197. See also Jennings v. Lyons
(1876) 39 Wis. 553. The older Eng-

lish decisions seem to deny a right even
in quasi-contract, Cutter v. Powell, supra, note 11.

NOTES ON RECENT MISSOURI CASES

stated ought not to give the servant a right except in a case where his
default is due to no fault of his own. If the servant has deliberately
abandoned the contract he ought never to be permitted to recover in
quasi-contract or any other kind of an action. 3
Applying these rules to the agent's or his estate's right to recover
renewal commissions, the commissions ought not to be recoverable on
the contract itself. The consideration for the payment of the commissions is the performance by the agent of his side of the agreement
up to the very moment that they are payable."4 It ought to be, however,
that if the agent has stopped performance of his contract because of accidental incapacity, that the principal should be liable for any unpaid
benefit received from the original writing of the policy in an action of
quasi-contract, less such sum as he may have been damaged by the
agent's failure to render full performance of his side of the agreement.
Perhaps there might be one difficulty in the way of the agent's recovery,
and that would be that the value of such benefit could not be measured
in dollars and cents, but aside from this, and if the amount can be as,
certained, the right to relief seems clear.
Turning to the cases where the employer ends the agency wrongfully
by an improper discharge of the agent, the commissions can be recovered. In a situation of this kind the courts have almost always held that
the agent earns the right to renewal commissions when he first writes.the

13. Olmstead v. Beale (1837) 19
Pick. (Mass.) 528; Earp v. Tyler (1881)
73 Mo. 617. Contra: Britton v. Turner
(1834) 6 N. H. 481, 26 Am. Dec. 713.
This case permitted the employee to recover on a quantum meruit in spite of a
deliberate breach of the contract, and
would seem to be a decision, which in
an effort to "do equity" has encouraged
a man to leave his employ when so inclined resting assured that he will be
able to recover for the work that he has
done less possible damage that he may
have caused his employer.
There is a class of cases mid-way between the case of a deliberate breach by
the employer and an accidental breach
represented by cases where the employee
has acted in good faith, and has endeavored to live up to the agreement, but
has thru lack of ability failed to give
satisfaction to his employer, who has

discharged him, and been justified in so
doing. Ought such a servant be entitled to recover the value of his services?
There are some cases that have permitted him to do this, if he has acted in
good faith. See Woodward, Law of
Quasi Contract, sec. 174. See Lindner
v. Cape etc. Co. (1908) 131 Mo. App.
680, 111 S. W. 600, contra, containing
valuable discussion of Missouri decisions.
14. Mills v. Union etc. Co. (1899)
77 Miss. 327, 28 So. 954. In this case
the executor of the deceased agent
brought an action in equity to recover
renewal commissions accruing after the
death of the agent, his action being on
the contract, and being brought after
the renewal premiums were paid. The
court was right, it is submitted, in denying relief. The action should not have
been on the contract, but should have
been brought for unjust enrichment.
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policy. If this is the case, it follows naturally enough that the right
cannot be destroyed by the principal's illegal attempt to wipe out the

contract."
J. L. PARKS."

BILLS AND NOTES-PARTY SECONDARILY LIABLEPlaintiff
DISCHARGE. Highleyrnan v. McDowell Motor Car Co!
sued defendant, the McDowell Motor Car Company, on two promissory
notes executed by 0. L. Boss to the defendant and indorsed by the defendant to the plaintiff. Prior to this action plaintiff had brought suit
on the same notes against Boss, the maker, but failed to recover, judgment being rendered for Boss in consequence of the finding of the jury
that certain equities existed between Boss and the payee, the Motor Car
Company, which discharged Boss, of which equities the plaintiff had
knowledge when he purchased the notes. In the present suit against
the Motor Car Company on its contract of indorsement the Kansas City
Court of Appeals held the indorser liable, the judgment in favor of the
maker in the previous suit not operating to discharge the Motor Car
Company.
At common law the indorser or drawer is, as a general rule, discharged if, by act of the holder, the maker or acceptor is discharged,
or any right of the indorser or drawer against other parties to the instrument is impaired.' But this rule does not extend to cases where the

15. Newcomb v. Imperial etc. Co.
(1892) 51 Fed. 725; Wells v. National
etc. Co. (1900) 99 Fed. 222; Aetna etc.
Co. v. Nexsen (1882) 84 Ind. 347, 43
Am. Rep. 91; Lewis v. Atlas etc. Co.
(1876) 61 Mo. 534; Sterling v. Metropolitan etc. Co. (1888) 2 N. Y. Supp. 84,
aff'd without opinion (1891) 130 N. Y.
632, 29 N. E. 150; Richey v. Union etc.
Co. (1909) 140 Mo. 486, 122 N. W. 1030.
In Hepburn v. Montgomery (1884) 97
N. Y. 617, it was held that the obligation of the insurance company to continue to pay renewal commissions was
subject to the implied condition that it
would continue in business for the term
covered by the contract; and that the insolvency of the company resulting in its
dissolution would excuse its receiver from
further liability as to renewal commissions. The case is distinguishable from

the cases cited above because of the implied condition. But is the implication
Usually the insolvency of
warranted?
the employer does not excuse him from
liability to his employees for a premature ending of the contract of employment. Should the fact that the employer in this case was a corporation change
the rule?
16. Professor of Law, University of
Missouri School of Law.-Ed.
1. (1920) 216 S. W. (Mo. App.) 52.
2. Ex Porte Wilson (1805) 11 Ves.
1145;
Jun. 410, 32 English Repiint
English v. Darley (1800) 2 Bos. & Pul.
61, 126 English Reprint 1156; Gould et
al v. Robson (1807) 8 East 576, 103
English Reprint 463; Smith v. Rice
(1858) 27 Mo. 505; Couch v. Waring
(1832) 9 Conn. 261.
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maker or acceptor is discharged by operation of law.' Thus, if the holder agrees with the maker to stay execution on a judgment against him
for a specified period, such agreement will operate to discharge the indorser;' if the holder who has satisfied a judgment against the maker
for the amount of the note later sues the indorser for a balance of interest due on the note and not included in the judgment, he cannot recover since he has voluntarily taken a judgment for a smaller sum, thereby discharging the maker and destroying the remedy of the indorser
against the maker.' On the other hand it has been held that if the
maker is discharged by the Statute of Limitations, the indorser is not
discharged.'
Nor does the discharge of the maker by virtue of a bankruptcy or insolvency act discharge parties secondarily liable
In view
of the foregoing, the decision in the case under review would seem beyond question as a common law proposition. The discharge of Boss by
virtue of the judgment in the preceding suit would be ineffectual to discharge the Motor Car Company on its contract of indorsement.
Section 120, Clause 3, of the Negotiable Instruments Law, as recommended to the Legislatures of the various states and as adopted, without modification, by all but Illinois and Missouri,' provides that "a person secondarily liable on the instrument is discharged
.
.
.
(3)
by the discharge of a prior party." This clause was one of the several
subjects of the Ames-Brewster controversy with respect to the Negotiable Instruments Law, Dean Ames taking the view that Clause 3 included any discharge, whether by act of the holder or by operation of
law, and Judge Brewster maintaining that by virtue of the rule of
statutory construction that in statutory revisions restating the common
law no change is presumed except by the clearest and most imperative
implication, this clause applied only to discharges by the holder and excluded discharges by operation of law.' The few cases in which this

3. Ex parte Jacobs (1875) 10 L. R.
Chan. App. Cases 211; Phillips v. Solo.
mon (1871) 42 Ga. 192; Guild v. Butler (1877) 122 Mass. 498; Post v. Losey
(1887) 111 Ind. 74. See also MacDonald v. Bovington (1792) 4 T. R. 825, 100
English

Reprint

1323; Nadin v.

Battie

(1804) 5 East 147, 102 English Reprint
1025; Chitty on Bills, 10th Ed. p. 289;
Story, Bills of Exchange, 2nd Ed., p.
558; Story on Promissory. Notes, 7th
Ed., p. 589..
4. Smith v. Rice (1858) 27 Mo. 505.
5. Couch v. Waring (1832) 9 Conn.
261.

6. Nelson v. First National Bank
(1895) 69 Fed. 798.
7. See cases in Note 2, supra.
8. The Illinois act omits Clause 3.
See flurd's Revised Statutes, 1917, Ch.
98, Sec. 137. The Missouri act adds to
Clause 3, "except when such discharge
is had in bankruptcy proceedings." See
Revised Statutes, Missouri, 1909, Sec.
10090.
9. For the complete text of the
Ames-Brewster
controversy
on
this
point, see Brannan, The Negotiable In.
strumets Law, Third Edition, pp. 430-1;
444-5; 453; 528-30.
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point has arisen under the N. I. L. seem to support the contention of
Judge Brewster. In Silverman v. Rubenstein" it was held that a composition in bankruptcy against the maker of a promisory note would not
operate to discharge the indorsers, the discharge being effected by operation of law and not by consent of the parties. The court did not, however,
cite the N. I. L. In Everding & Farrel v. Toft," the court stated, in a
dictum, that Section 120, Clause 3, "only applies to a discharge by the
act of the creditor, and does not include discharges by operation of law,
for example bankruptcy, nor does it embrace a situation where after
trial on the merits the note is in effect destroyed because of a vice which
is inherent in the transaction." Had the Missouri case now under review been decided under Section 120, Clause 3, of the N. I. L., as generally adopted, it is a fair guess that practically every jurisdiction would
have upheld the contention of Judge Brewster.
As already noted, the Missouri statute adds to Clause 3 the words
"except when such discharge is had in bankruptcy proceedings," thereby
making the section read: "A person secondarily liable on the instru.
(3) by the discharge of a prior party,
.
.
ment is discharged
except when such discharge is had in bankruptcy proceedings." While
the result reached by the court in the case under review is desirable, can
the decision be supported on principle in view of the peculiar wording
of the Missouri statute? It would seem doubtful. The court, in reaching its decision, contents itself with stating that "Clause 3 of said statute
is merely declaratory of the common law theretofore existing, and the
discharge therein mentioned does not mean a discharge by operation of
law, but a discharge by some act or neglect of the creditor." It entirely
overlooks the fact that the Missouri statute, after laying down in general words that a person secondarily liable on an instrument is discharged
by the discharge of a prior party, adds a single and express exception"except when such discharge is had in bankruptcy proceedings." By a
well known principle of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, this exception affirms the application of the general words
Or,
to all other cases not excepted and excludes all other exceptions."
to put it as stated by Sutherland in his work on Statutory Construction:
"The exception of a particular thing from the operation of the general
words of a statute shows that in the opinion of the lawmaker the thing
excepted would be within the general words had not the exception been
162 N. Y.

S. 266; Olive Cemetery Co. v. City of

Supp. 733.

10.

(1917)

11.
12.

(1916) 82 Ore. 1, 160 Pac. 1160.
Bend v. Hoyt (1839) 13 Pet. 263.

at 271-2; Arnold v. U. S. (1892)

147

U. S. 494, at 499; Equitable Life Assur.
ance Soc. v. Clements (1890) 140 U.

93 Pa. St. 129;
Philadelphia (1880)
Bracket v. Ohio R. R. Co. (1850) 14 Pa.

St. 241, 243; Sherwin v. Bugbee (1844)

16 Vt. 439, at 445.
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made.""
Applying this principle to the case under review, the discharge
of Boss, tho by operation of law, would discharge the indorser, since

the discharge was not "had in bankruptcy proceedings." To avoid such
an unfortunate result the court treated Clause 3 as if the exception with
respect to bankruptcy proceedings had been omitted.
The difficulty lies, of course, in the wording of the Missouri act.
The addition of the exception with respect to bankruptcy to Clause 3 is
not only unnecessary in view of the common law and particularly in view
of Section 16 of the National Bankruptcy Act," which covers the precise situation, but it renders it impossible for a court to reach a desirable result in an action against an indorser in just such a case as Highleyman v. McDowell Motor Car Company where the indorser had been
discharged by operation of law otherwise than as a result of bankruptcy
proceedings, without ignoring a well established principle of statutory construction, as was done in this case.
STANLEY H. UDY."

CONFLICT OF LAWS-SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACT CONTAINING STIPULATION THAT SAME SHALL BE
GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF ANOTHER STATE-PLEADING
THE FOREIGN LAW. Fidelity Loan Securities Company v. Moore.'
This was an action for the specific performance of a contract to purchase real estate, made by defendant. The land was situated in Texas,
and the agreement contained a stipulation that in the event of a dispute,
or of litigation to enforce the contract, that the laws of Texas, as interpreted by the courts of that State, should control the rights and obligations of the parties. The contract also, by its terms, was to be performed in Texas. The entire contract, including the stipulation, was set
forth in the petition, but the plaintiff did not plead the laws of Texas,
nor did it allege anything concerning such laws or their effect on the
right to bring this action. Defendant demurred to the petition and the
trial court sustained the demurrer. On plaintiff's appealing, the Supreme
Court affirmed the judgment, nisi, holding that plaintiff's failure to plead
the laws of Texas rendered the petition fatally defective.
In making the decision, the Supreme Court placed some stress on
the fact that the laws of Texas were made a part of the contract by
13. 2 Lewis' Sutherland, Statutory
Construction, 2nd Edition, p. 672.
14. See 30 Stats. at L. 544. Section
16 of this Act reads as follows: "The
liability of a person who is co-debtor
with, or guarantor, or in any manner a

surety for, a bankrupt shall not be alter.
ed by the discharge of such bankrupt."
15. Assistant Professor of Law, School
of Law, University of Missouri.-Ed.
1. (1919) 217 S. W. 286.

LAW SERIES

20,

MISSOURI BULLETIN

direct reference, but the real reason for the decision was that the laws
of Texas "constitute a part of the very cause of action, and should be
pleaded as well as proven in the trial of the case."'
It is generally held, as in the instant case, that parties may stipulate
that the laws of a foreign state shall control their rights and obligaticins
under a contract. Such a stipulation will control under proper conditions,
and the law will be applied if it is not contrary to the policy of the forum. In such a case the law of the forum "is material only as setting a
'
limit of policy beyond which obligations will not be enforced there."
Accordingly, the law agreed on is the very basis of the cause of action
It follows naturally
and without it plaintiff must fail altogether.'
enough from this, that the court has got to have the law agreed upon
before it gives relief. It would seem, therefore, that the only question,
so far as the case under review is concerned is, was the law of Texas
before the court so as to enable it to give plaintiff specific performance?
Certainly it was not there as a result of plaintiff's own efforts. If it
was before the court it must have been there by virtue of some rule,
which would permit the court to dispense with what might otherwise
well have been deemed an essential allegation of the petition, and to
indulge in some kind of a presumption, which in a loose sense of the
word, might be said to be in aid of a defective pleading. Before considering this problem, and answering the question, it is proposed to consider the general matter of presumptions as to foreign law, and to then
determine the propriety of substituting a presumption, if there be one as
to that law, for a pleading of the same.
A line of decisions has established the rule that the common law is
presumed to obtain in those states carved out of what was once English
territory, or inthose states wherein the common law was put in force by
act of Congress. The courts of this State will in a case properly determinable according to the law of such a foreign state, there being no
proof as to the nature of the same, presume that it is the same as the
This is the rule
common law, as interpreted by the courts of Missouri
2. (1919) 217 S. W. 286, p. 289.
3. See statement by Graves, J., in
the principal case and authorities there
cited. 217 S. W. 1. c. 288. The quotation is from the opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes, in the case of Cuba R. Co.
v. Crosby 222 U. S. I. c. 478, where
the learned judge was discussing an analogous case.
4. Graves, J., in the principal case
Wharton on C m217 S. W. 1. c. 289.
flict
of Laws, Third Edition by Parm-

ele. sec. 772, and authorities there cited.
5. Hazelett v. Woodruff 150 Mo. 534,
.51 S. W. 1048. Rashall v. Ry. Co.
(1913) 249 Mo. 509, 155 S. W. 426.
Cherry v. Cherry (1914) 258 Mo. 391
167 S. W. 539. Wentz v. Ry. Co.
(1914) 259 Mo. 450, 168 S. W. 1166.
Orthwein v. Ins. Co. (1914) 261 Mo.
650, 170 S. W. 885. See also notes 67
L. R. A. 3; 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 268; 18
Id. 40.
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even tho the common law on the subject may have been changed in
Missouri. Thus in Davis v. McColl we find the court deciding a question relating to negotiable instruments according to the common law, as
it existed in Missouri prior to the adoption of the Negotiable Instruments
Act.
On the other hand, there is a class of cases where the courts will
not presume that the common law is in -force in a foreign state. It
is obvious, of course, that if the foreign law is proved that there is no
room for a presumption at all, and that the law as proved will prevail,'
Sometimes, however, there is no proof, but the court cannot make the
presumption because of facts, of which it must take judicial notice.
While courts do not take judicial notice of what the law of another state
is on any given question, they do take such notice "of the system of law
that is the basis of the jurisprudence of another jurisdiction."'
If this
is the case, then it must be that if the court knows that another state is
not one where the common law ever prevailed, because of that state's
origin, it cannot presume that the common law is in force there. Accordingly, Missouri courts will not presume that the common law prevails in a state which, before it became a part of the Union was not subject to the laws and jurisdiction of England, or was not made subject
to the same by an act of Congress.' The reason for the rule is, as intimated, because the court cannot on any reasonable basis indulge in
such a presumption in such a situation. The fact of the state's origin,
which is known to the court, conclusively rebuts it.
Sometimes a question is properly determinable according to the law
of a sister state, where the common law has never been in force but a
statute in this State gives a similar right to that claimed by a plaintiff in
his action. It has been held in this kind of a case that it will be presumed that the statutory law of the foreign state is the same as that of
this State, there being no proof to the contrary."
This rule has been

6.
(1914) 179 Mo. App.
W. 1113; see also Bank v.
Co. (1909)
139 Mo. App.
W. 648. And Brown v.
(1912)
162 Mo.
1082.
7.
Mathieson
Mo. 542, 118 S.
(1910)
149 Mo.

App.

198, 166 S.
Commission
110, 120 S.
Worthington

508, 142

S. W.

v. Ry. Co. (1909) 219
W. 9. Ham v. Ry. Co.

App. 200, 130 S. W.
407.
8. Wharton on
Conflict of Laws,
Third Edition by Parmele, sec. 781 et

seq.
The quotation is from Wharton
at this point.
9. Flato v. Mulhall (1880)
72 Mo.
5'?; Sloan v. Torry (1883) 78 Mo. 623;
Wi'aschrck v. Glass (1891) 46 Mo. App.
209; Clark v. Barnes (1894)
58 Mo.
App. 667.
10. Madden v. Ry. Co. (1917) 192 S.
kV. 455; Lee v Ry. Co. (1906) 195 Mo.
490. 9? S. W. 614; Wyeth v. Lang Co.
(1893)
54 Mo. App. 147; Barhydt v
Alexander (1894) 59 Mo. App. 188.

LAW SERIES

20, MISSOURI

BULLETIN

severely critized, and has been said to be the equivalent of taking judicial

notice of a foreign statute."
It having been shown that the court can, in certain cases, enumerated above, presume that the law of the foreign state is the same as
that of the forum, the next question to be determined is: ought the

court to make the presumption, if the petition of the plaintiff contains
no allegation upon which the fact, if presumed, can be based? A presumption, according to Professor Thayer, is a process whereby a fact

is taken for granted; given a certain state of facts, the law holds that
another fact will follow from the former without proof; in other words,
the ultimate fact, which is the one that it is desired to establish, will be

presumed to exist. This assumption is made either because the law, by
reason of some policy,
ing, or because human
natural sequence from
As the learned author

believes that the fact ought to be taken
experience has found that the fact is
the tacts upon which the presumption
shows, a presumption then is a mere

as existusually a
is based.
short cut

taken to establish a fact, and the result of taking the short cut is that a
fact is taken as proved without the labor of proving it."
This being the nature of a presumption, it is urged that a court should
never make one, and take a fact as proven through this method, unless
the fact would have been admissable in -evidence under the petition in
the ordinary way. After all a presumption is only a substitute for proof;
it is a method of taking a fact as proved. Accordingly, for this reason,
it is submitted, no fact ought to be presumed unless it would be provable
under the pleadings if there were no grounds for making the presumption.
If a presumption is only a substitute for proof, is it not essential to
have the same grounds for making the presumption that it would be
essential to have to prove the fact, if no presumption could be made?
This proposition, when the matter is considerd, seems to be obvious
enough and inevitable. While there is little authority on the general
question, there is an analogous case in the Supreme Court of the United
States which seems to support the writer's contention. In Mountain View
etc. Co. v. McFadden3 it was urged by plaintiffs that the court ought to
take judicial notice of a fact which was essential to plaintiffs' cause of
action, but plaintiffs had laid no foundation for the proof of this fact
in their pleadings. They had not alleged that the fact existed. The
court conceded that it knew the fact to exist, but refused to take notice
of it because plaintiffs had not chosen to rely on the existence of that
fact as a part of their cause. Said the Court: "But the circuit court
11.

Opinion of Woodson, J., in Mad-

den v. Ry. Co. supra note 10, 192 S. W.

1. c. 458.
12.

Thayer,

Evidence
13.

Preliminary

Treatise

on

at

the

Common

Law chap.

VIII.

(1901)

Rep. 488.

180 U. S. 533, 21 Sup. Ct.
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could not make plaintiff's case other than they made it by taking judicial
notice of facts which they did not choose to rely on in their pleading.
The averments brought no controversy in this regard into court, in respect of which resort might be had to judicial knowledge." 13a Now judicial notice is merely another case where the court will dispense with
the proof of a fact, and take the fact known as proved; if the court
knows a fact to exist, it will excuse the party from proving it; it is a
short cut to establish a fact; it is a substitute for proof. But the court
clearly holds that the short cut cannot be taken unless the fact could have
been proven in the round-about-way; if the fact could not have been
proved without judicial notice, then it will not be provable thru this
method. It would seem that the decision is good law, and good sense,
and that the principle adopted is altogether applicable to our problem.
If this is the case, then it follows that the court will not make a presumption unless the pleading lays the foundation by properly alleging
the fact, which is to be presumed to exist. For these reasons the decision in the principal case is believed to be sound. Conceding that presumptions can sometimes be made as to foreign law, still they ought
never to be made unless the law desired to be presumed would be provable under the pleading.
While the writer has urged that the law of a foreign state ought always to be pleaded, and no presu'mption about it ought to be indulged in
unless the pleading contains a basis for such a presumption, still the
rule in some cases is contra. In Wharton on Conflict of Laws ' it is said
that if the-case is one where the court can either assume that the common law prevails in the foreign state, or that there is statutory law in
the foreign state similar to that of the forum, then the plaintiff need not
plead the foreign law, but the court will apply the law, which is presumed to exist. Some fdur cases are cited to sustain this rule, but the
editor points out that the rule "is generally assumed by the cases on the
subject," which is undoubtedly true. Why, however, this should be the
rule is a matter as to which the cases leave one in the dark. It should
not be the rule and if it is applied, it involves the violation of another
fundamental rule to the effect that a man can only prove those matters
that are comprised within the allegations of his pleading.
Suppose that the rule is as stated in the last paragraph, does the decision in the case under review conflict with the same? It is believed
that it does not, for the reason that the court could not make any presumption as to the law of Texas. The court knew that Texas is not a
common law state, or to use its expression, that Texas is not a state
13a. (1901)
180 U.
Sup. Ct. Rep. 488.

S.

1. c. 535, 21

14.

Wharton

on

Conflict

of

Laws.

Third Edition by Parmele, sec. 781f.
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where the "equitable doctrines of the common law" prevail. This being
so, the court could not presume that "common law," or English equity
existed in Texas. Nor is there a statute in Missouri, which gives a party
So the court
a right to specific performance in a case like plaintiff's.
could not assume that the statutory law of Texas was the same as that
of the forum. There was no statute in the forum giving a right to a
plaintiff similarly situated. It is believed, therefore, that to this point
the case is right on principle, and within the authorities, as well.
Occasionally it has been held that if the court cannot make a presumption as to the foreign law either because it knows that the common
law cannot prevail in the foreign state, or because there is no statute in
the forum, which gives a right similar to that claimed by the plaintiff to
which the foreign law can be assumed to be similar, that the court will
apply the law of the forum on the theory that it is the only law before
it. Where the decision is to this effect, no presumption as to the nature
of the foreign law is made at all, and the rule if it is to be justified at
all, is based on the theory that "the parties by failing to prove the proper
foreign law have impliedly agreed to abide by the law of the forum.""
e
This rule has been adopted in several Missouri cases" and was urged by
Blair, J., in his dissenting opinion in the principal case as one that might
The propriety of these decisions might well be quesbe acceptable."
tioned. Is the agreement by implication to this effect? But even so,
the decisions are not inconsistent with, or contrary to the principal case.
It must be remembered that the only point decided in this case was
that where a plaintiff's case depends on the law of a foreign state, that
plaintiff's petition is not demurrer proof unless the same pleads the law
of the foreign state. In all the cases cited, which apply the law of the
forum for want of any other law to be applied, the defendant did not
demur to the petition, but on the contrary joined issue and went to trial.
This being the situation, the court might well have felt that the matter
of pleading the foreign law might be regarded as waived. In fact in
Biggie v. Chicago etc. R. R. " the court intimated that this was the rea15. Wharton on Conflict of Laws,
Third Edition by Parmele, sec. 781d;
the quotation is from the editor at this
point.
16. Flato v. Mulhall (1880) 72 Mo.
522; Philpot v. Ry. Co. (1884) 85 Mo.
167 (dictum). Thompson v. Ry. Co.
(1912) 243 Mo. 336, 148 S. W. 484; Lyons v. Ry. Co. (1913) 253 Mo. 143, 161
S. W. 726. Biggie v. Ry. Co. (1911)
159 Mo. App. 350, 140 S. W. 602. McManus v. Ry. Co. (1906) 118 Mo. App.

152, 94 S. W. 743. Sterling v. Ry. Co.
(1914) 185 Mo. App. 192, 170 S. W.
1156.
17. (1919) 217 S. W. 1. c. 290.
18. (1911) 159 Mo. App. 1. c. 351,
140 S. W. 602. There is dicta to be
found in other cases to the same effect.
so in Lee v. Ry. Co. (1905) 195 Mo.
415, the court said: "By the strict rules
of pleading therefore the plaintiffs in
their petition should have stated the
laws of Kansas applicable to the facts to
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son why the court did apply the law of the forum, saying: "Defendant
did not attack the petition by demurrer, nor plead in its answer that no
cause existed under the laws of Iowa * * * ." The statement clearly
shows that the court felt that had the petition come up on demurrer that
it might have been regarded as defective, just as the Supreme Court regarded the petition in the instant case in this light. While there may be
some decisions in Missouri on some phases of this question which are
not all that could be desired, still they are distinguishable from the
principal case which is certainly correct and is a decided step in the
right direction.

J. L. PARKS"5

CHARITABLE TRUST-RULE IN Morice v. The Bishop of
Durham. Jones v. Patterson.' Fannie R. Lytle by her will gave all her
property in California and the rent of a 160 acre farm in Platte County,
Missouri, to her husband for life, and at his death to be "placed" in the
hands of the defendant, "to be used for missionary purposes in whatever field he thinks best to use it, so it is done in the name of my dear
Savior and for the salvation of souls."
The court held this provision of the will invalid as being too indefinite and uncertain, both as to purpose and as to object because no
particular form of the Christian religion was intended to be propagated
or advanced, and because the scope of the field in which the trustee was
empowered to exercise the charity was as unlimited as human thought
"when applied to the determination of what constitutes a belief in the
Christian religion." It was thought that no court could supervise the
application of the fund, for it fixes upon no definite object, but in effect made the defendant the owner of the property. Consequently, the
property descended to the testatrix's heir at law.
show that the deceased if he had lived
could under that law have maintained
an action for damages, and if timely objection to the petition had been made
by demurrer or otherwise it would
doubtless have been sustained * * *."
Again in Madden v. Ry. Co. 192 S. W.
1. c. 456 the court said: "The courts
of Missouri do not take judicial notice
of the judicial decisions, or the statutory law of sister states * * *. Hence
they can only be brought to the knowledge of the courts of Missouri where
their consideration is essential to the

sustention of a cause of action or a defense by being both pleaded and proven
by the party relying upon them."
19. In the preparation of this note,
the writer has been furnished with the
Missouri authorities by Lynn Webb Esq.,
LL. B., University of Missouri, of the
Kansas City, Mo. Bar. Mr. Webb has
also generously made some other useful
suggestions but he is in no way responsible for the conclusions that have been
reached.
1. (1917) 271 Mo. 1, 195 S. W. 1004-
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The law takes a different view with reference to private trusts and
charitable trusts. The well recognized public policy of disapproving the
tieing up of property for long periods of time is rather strictly applied
in the case of private trusts. Among the most noted examples is Musset v. Bingle, where the interest on a sum of money was bequeathed for
the perpetual upkeep of a monument to the testator's wife's first husband. This was held bad by the English court because it kept property out of commerce forever and also because it involved the perpetual
upkeep of a non-charitable trust.
In the ab;ence of a statute such gifts have been held invalid if the
distribution of the trust fund extended beyond the period specified in
the rule against perpetuities, viz: lives in being and twenty-one years
thereafter.
In dealing with bequests and devises for charitable trusts, however,
a more liberal rule has been adopted, and trusts founded upon such bequests and devises are not invalid even tho they extend over long indefinite periods of time or even perpetually.'
The prevailing rule is that once the bequest is considered a charitable trust the elements of indefiniteness as to purpose and uncertainty
as to object will not defeat the disposition, but the courts will uphold
it and enforce it thru the Attorney-General.
In In re Best,' a provision "for such charitable and benevolent institutions as the trustees shall determine," was upheld. In Rickarby v.
Nicholson' a provision for "such religious or charitable purposes as the
trustee shall think fit," was held valid. Also, in Everett v. Carr' a provision was held valid "for charitable purposes for the greatest relief of
human suffering, human wants, and for the good of the greatest number." This bequest includes a field whose scope also is as unlimited as
human thought, and conceivably gives.more latitude than does the will
in the principal case, yet the Maine court found no difficulty in sustaining the bequest. A like result was reached in Salstonstal v. Saunders," where the bequest was to trustees to hold and invest the same and
appropriate so much of the whole of the principal and income as they
might think proper, "to the furtherance of and promotion of the cause
of piety and good morals, or in aid of objects and purposes of benevolence and charity, public and private, or temperance, for the education
of deserving youths." The bequest was upheld as to all its provisions
2.

(1876)

1 W. N. 170.

3. Dawvson v. Small (1874) L. R. 16
'Eq. 114; In re Rogerson (1901) 1 Ch.
715; Burke v. Burke (1913) 259 111.
262,
102 N. 1,. 293.

4.
412.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Pell v. Mercer (1885)
(1904)
(1912)
(1871)
(1865)

2 Ch. 354.
1 I. R. 343.
59 Me. 325.
11 Allen (Mass.)

14 R. I.

446.
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and the court announced that it would find means of supervising the
trust.' There are other decisions sustaining similar trusts." In Miller
v. Teachout' the bequest was in trust, "to the advancement of the Christ-

ian religion in the trustee's judgment." The Ohio court experienced no
difficulty in giving effect to the charitable intention of the testator."
Walker, P. J., in the principal case, apparently cited Morice v. The
Bishop of Durham" for the proposition that the object of the trust must
be sufficiently definite so that a court of equity can enforce the application of the trust fund in conformity to the expressed wishes of its
creator. An analysis of that case, however, will show that it does not
so hold. The trust created in the Bishop's case was a bequest to the
defendant to dispose of the ultimate residue of the testatrix's estate to
such objects of "benevolence and liberality" as the Bishop in his own
discretion should approve. The court held the trust invalid because
the words, "benevolence and liberality" were broader than the word
charity. The objection was not that the bequest was indefinite and uncertain as a charity but that it was too broad to be a charity at all. The
court in the principal case considers the gift as a charity and so considered, Morice v. The Bishop of Durham, supra, is no authority for holding this charitable trust invalid because of indefiniteness.
Another famous case relied upon by the court was Tilden v. Green."
There Samuel J. Tilden left a large sum of money to a corporation not
then in existence for the purpose of maintaining a free library and reading room in the City of New York, and such other educational and
scientific purposes as the trustees should designate. This provision was
held invalid because the will of the trustees and not the will of the
9. "If at any time hereafter doubt
should arise as to the mode of distribution, or the trustees should exercise
their discretion illegally or unreasonably,
this court, upon bill or information, may
control and regulate the administration
of the charity."
10. Jackson v. Phillips (1867) 14 Al.
len (Mass.)
539; Welch v. Caldwell
(1907) 226 Ill.488, 80 N. E. 1014;
Pell v. Mercer (1885) 14 R. I. 412;
Swazey
v. American Bible Society
(1869) 57 Me. 523; Coffen v. Attorney
General (1919) 231 Mass. 575, 121 N.
E. 397; Miller v. Tatum (1918) 181 Ky.
490, 205 S. W. 557; Re Welch (1918)
105 Misc. 27, 172 N. Y. Supp. 349. "The
mere fact that the purpose of a charit-

able trust is left indefinite is not fatal
according to the better view and weight
of authority, provided it is limited to
charitable purposes."
Austin W. Scott,
33 Harvard Law Review 695.
11.
(1874) 24 Ohio St. 525.
12. Re Dulle's Estate (1907) 218 Pa.
162, 67 Atl. 49; Selleck v. Thompson
(1907)
28 R. I. 350, 67 At. 425; Re
Stewart's Estate (1901)
26 Wash. 32,
66 Pac. 148.
13. (1805)
10 Ves. 521.
See also
Smith v. Pond (1919) 107 At.
(N. J.
Eq.) 800, 29 Yale Law Journal 242.
14.
(1891)
130 N. Y. 29, 28 N. E.
880; Ames, Lect. Leg. Hist. 285, 5 Harv.
L. Rev. 389.
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testator was made controlling. But the decision in that case has not
stood the test of time. Two years later the legislature of New York
passed an act which nullified the doctrine of the Tilden case." Later
cases in New York dealing with trusts of this nature have regularly7
sustained them." Like statutory changes have taken place in Virginia,1
and Tennessee," and the prior decisions in those states," some of which
are cited by the court in the principal case, must be considered as recalled.
In Schmucker's Estate v. Reel' it was held by the Missouri court
that a trust, to be applied according to the best discretion of the trustee,
must fail for uncertainty. But the decision is no weight in the solution of the present problem, for the reason that the gift was not for a
charitable purpose. In such a case the rule in Morice v. The Bishop of
Durham would properly apply.
In Board of Trustees v. May" a portion of the testatrix's estate
was given to a person "to use as he may desire in the master's work."
In Hadley v. Forsee" a bequest was made to the testator's wife "to advance the cause of religion and promote the cause of charity as the
wife should think the most conducive to carrying out the testator's
wishes." In both cases the gifts were held invalid because of uncertainty of the beneficiaries. But such is not the prevailing rule in the
United States. Only Michigan, Minnesota, and Maryland" adhere to
this view of charitable trusts. Furthermore, an attempt was made in
Michigan in 1903 to change the rule by legislation, but the act was declared unconstitutional because of insufficiency of the title of the act.
In West Virginia" it has been held that sec. 3 and sec. 10 of ch. 57, Code
1906 had changed the previous rule in that state (in accord with the old
law of Virginia) as to charitable trusts.
It is submitted that the rule in Missouri, followed in the principal
case,-is undesirable and unfortunate and that the Supreme Court of
15.

Acts 1893, ch. 701.

16.

Matter of

Cunntingham

Rep. 745; Reeves v. Reeves (1880)
(1912)

(1876) 61 Mo. 592.
(1906) 201 Mo. 360, 99 S. W.

206 N. Y. 601, 100 N. E. 437; RothSchiff (1907) 188 N. Y. 327,
80 N. E. 1030.
17. Va. Acts, 1914, p. 414, Code,
sec. 1420.
18. Shannon's New Code, sec. 3530,
a. I.
19. Carpenter v. Miller (1869) 3 W.

20.
21.
1093.
22.
59.
23.
Harv.
24.

Va. 174; Fifield ?.. Van Wyck

Va. 17, 80 S. E. 827.

(1897)

94 Va. 557, 27 S. E. 446, 64 Am. St.

5

Lea (Tenn.) 644.

(1907) 203 Mo. 418, 101 S. W.
Ames, Lect. Leg. Hist. 285; 5
L. Rev. 389.
Hays v. Harris (1914) 73 W.
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Missouri has not followed modern authority. A change of viewpoint
might disturb certain titles but the balance of convenience is in favor of
the change.'
Moberly, Missouri.

DAVID P. JANES'

PLEADING-RIGHT OF PLAINTIFF TO AMEND AFTER
JUDGMENT. Swift et al v. Union Fire Insurance Company. The Supreme Court in the above case held that if a petition entirely omitted to
allege a fact necessary to the statement of a cause of action, the defect
is fatal and cannot be cured by amendment of the petition after rendition
of a verdict, but a motion in arrest of judgment will lie .
The facts in the case are: A sued B upon a parol contract to insure A's house, alleging that the contract was upon the same terms as
a previous policy which was set out in the petition. The petition omitted to allege consideration for the parol promise to insure. This defect
was not objected to until after a trial upon the merits, which resulted
in a verdict in favor of plaintiff. Then a motion in arrest was made.
The trial court allowed the plaintiff to amend his petition and entered
judgment upon the verdict for plaintiff.
Numerous authorities support the view that the allegation of consideration in a suit on a contract not importing a consideration is a necessary part of the cause of action.' It is one of those "radical constitutional defects" which is not cured by verdict,' and can be taken advantage of by motion in arrest.' Section 2774 R. S. Mo. 1909, makes it
unnecessary to allege a consideration in certain classes of written contracts,' but does not affect parol contracts.
In Pa. Del. etc. Nay. Co. v. Dandridge' practically the same question
arose as in the principal case. That was a suit upon a contract and no
consideration was alleged. The court in sustaining a motion in arrest
said: "The object of all pleadings is that the parties litigant may be
mutually apprised of the matters in controversy between them. The
declaration should substantially present the facts necessary to constitute
the plaintiff's right of action, that the defendant being forewarned of
25. See Klocke v. Klocke (1919) 276
Mo. 572 1. c. 581, 208 S. W. 825.
26.

Graduated from

School of Law,

3. Robinson v. Barbour (1840)
Blackford (Ind.) 468.
4.

5

Pa. Del. & Md. Steam Nov. Co.

April 1920, with degree of LL.B.-Ed.
1. (1919) 216 S. W. 935, 217 S. W.

v. Dandridge (1836) 8 Gill & J. (Md.)
248, 29 Am. Dec. 543.

1003.
2. 13 C. J. 722; Polland v. Hollander (1909) 115 N. Y. Supp. 1042, 62
Misc. 523.

5. Eyermann v. Piron (1899)
Mo. 107 1. c. 115, 52 S. W. 229.
6. See note 4 supra.
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the nature of proof to be preferred against him, may, if necessary be
prepared to contradict, explain or avoid it."
There is another class of cases, presenting a situation somewhat analagous to the principal case, which frequently has been before the
courts. The Missouri Supreme Court often has held that the plaintiff
must decide what action he will bring, and once having elected, must
clearly state and prove it.' The plaintiff cannot allege a number of
facts with no particular cause of action in view and then adopt his relief to his evidence. As was said by a learned Wisconsin judge, speaking of the petition provided for by the code, "It cannot be 'fish, flesh
or fowl' according to the appetite of the attorney preparing the dish
set before the court."'
The principle sustained by the decisions is that
the function of a complaint is to place both parties on an equal footing.
The idea should not be overlooked that the plaintiff is the actor calling
the defendant into court and that it is his duty to state a cause of
action "in plain and concise" language. This duty said Sherwood, J.,
in Huston v. Tyler" "is the primary duty of the party drawing the
pleading and the latter cannot cast that onus on his opponent by failing
to perform his own duty in the first instance and that duty consists in
expressing his meaning clearly and unmistakably."" The purpose of
the decisions is to guard the right of the defendant to be informed of
the issues, the nature and kind of proof required to rebut the plaintiff's
case.

It is suggested that the rule announced in the principle case is justifiable on the same grounds. The defendant could not be informed of
something which is omitted from the petition. He could not know
the kind and nature of proof required of him. Tho the spirit of the

code is to prevent failure of justice because of formal defects which do
not injure or prejudice the rights of either party, yet the code did not
relieve the plaintiff from clearly defining the issues by stating all the essential elements of his cause of action. The code did not change the
substance of the different causes of action, but operated only on the
form of pleading."'
7. Huston v. Tyler (1897)

140 Mo.

252, 36 S. W. 654.
8. Carson v. Cummings (1879)
69
Mo. 325. Huston v. Tyler (1897) 140
Mo. 252, 36 S. W. 654. Henry Co. v.
Citizens Bank (1907) 208 Mo. 1. c. 226,
106 S. W. 622.
9. Supervisors etc. v. Decker (1872)
30 Wis. 624.

10.

See note 7 supra.

11. Young v. Schofield (1896) 132
Mo. 650, 34 S. W. 1. c. 499. Huston
v. Tyler, supra. Clark v. Dillon (1884)
97 N. Y. 370--cited with approval in
Young v. Schofield.
12. Sumner v. Rogers (1886) 90 Mo.
324, 2 S. W. 476.
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In Kliefoth v. The Northwestern Iron Co. " the following rule for
interpreting pleadings was announced: "In determining whether a complaint states a cause of action the question is not whether the plaintiff
used the most appropriate language, but whether the language used will
permit a construction which will sustain the pleading, and to that end
such effect should be given to its allegations as will support rather than
defeat it, if that can be done without adding, by way of construction,
material words not necessarily implied, or giving to the language used
a meaning that cannot be reasonably attributed to it." The above case
involved the question of whether the allegations of a petition sufficiently
connected the employment of a negligent servant with the act causing
the injury. The Wisconsin Court while giving full scope to the doctrine of inference refused to infer an essential element. The effect of
the decision is to limit the doctrine of inferring facts to formal necessary
inferences and to hold the plaintiff to the duty of alleging all the essential facts.
In Elwaine-Richards Co. v. Wall," in sustaining the rule that plaintiff must allege all the essential facts the Indiana Court said: "For the
rule recognized at common law and by our code affirms that material
facts necessary to constitute a cause of action must be directly averred
and cannot be left to depend upon or shown by mere recitals or inferences."
The Wisconsin and Indiana cases, supra, were, decided upon demurrers. They do not decide the exact question involved in the principal case, yet they illustrate that the liberality of the code towards the
plaintiff is not without limit.
The question of inferring facts has been before the Missouri Supreme
Court several times and an examination of the cases reveals that it has
drawn a distinction between a cause of action defectively set out and a
defective cause of action." There would seem to be no objection to
holding in the former case that a trial upon the merits will cure the
defect. Perhaps no better statement of the rule can be found than that
made by Gantt, P. J., in People's Bank etc. v. Scalzo :" "If a material
matter be not expressly averred in the petition, but the same is necessarily implied from what is stated in the context, the defect is cured
after verdict, the doctrine resting on the presumption that the plaintiff
13.
356.

(1898)

98 Wis. 495,

74 N.

W.

14. (1902) 159 Ind. 557, 65 N. E.
753.
15. McDermont v. Claas (1891) 104
Mo. 1. c. 21, 15 S. W. 995. Lynch v.
The St. Joseph & . Ry. Co. (1892) 111

Mo. 1. c. 605, 19 S. W. 1114.
The Salmon Falls Bank v. Leyser (1893) 116

Mo. 51, 22 S. W. 504. Bliss on Code
Pleading (3rd Ed.) Sec. 438.
16. (1895) 127 Mo. 164, 29 S. W.
1032.
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proved on the trial the facts imperfectly alleged, the existence of which
was essential to his recovery." The principal case comes within the latter class. It is a defective cause of action, an entire omission to state
sufficient facts and the question is not whether given a cause of action
imperfectly stated, a trial upon the merits will cure the imperfections,
but having none to start with, will the trial court manufacture one for
the plaintiff. It is submitted, that the latter course would be unfair to
the defendant.
A quick dispensing of justice would seem to demand that the issues
be clearly and fairly stated. The Missouri Statute relating to amendments contains language capable of being construed more liberally,"
and standing alone it could have been interpreted to allow greater freedom to amend, but this could not have been done consistent with good
pleading and the requirements of a principal section of the code requiring the plaintiff to make "a plain and concise statement of the facts constituting a cause of action without unnecessary repetition.""
Tho at first glance the decision of the principal case may seem to
sacrifice justice for form, it is suggested that to hold otherwise would
sanction loose pleading and compel defendant to surmise or infer the
issues. In the very nature of things a party who is in possession of the
facts should not be allowed to put upon his adversary the burden of badly
drawn pleadings.
It is submitted that upon reason and authority, and in the interest
of speedy and exact justice, the Supreme Court correctly refused to allow the plaintiff to amend hit petition after judgment.
I. C. N.

BILLS AND NOTES-RENUNCIATION BY HOLDER. Engle v.
Brown et al.' Defendants purchased a store building of plaintiff and
gave in part payment a negotiable promissory note secured by a deed of
trust on the building. Before the note became due defendant sold the
building to one Lobdell, who assumed the note and mortgage and agreed
to pay plaintiff. Plaintiff at the same time orally agreed with defendants to release them from liability on the note and accept Lobdell in
their stead. Defendants resisted payment on the ground that the above
transaction constituted a novation and discharged them from further
liability on the note. The Kansas City Court of Appeals, while conceding th, soundness of the defendant's contention prior to the enactment
of the Negotiable Instruments Law, held that under Section 122 of that
17. Sections
Mo. 1 09.

2119

and

2120 R.

S.

18. Section 1794 R. S. Mo.
1. (1919) 216 S. W. 541.

1909.
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Act (R S. Mo. 1909, Sec. 10092) the oral renunciation of the plaintiff,
unaccompanied by a surrender of the instrument, was ineffective to release defendant.
It is the well settled common law rule in this country that a unilateral contract right can be discharged before breach only by a sealed
instrument or by an agreement supported by a consideration. A mere
verbal release without consideration is ineffectual
The English courts
reached a different conclusion with respect to the obligation of parties
liable on negotiable instruments, holding that such an obligation may be
discharged by parol, without consideration, before or after breach.'
This doctrine was not, however, adopted by the great majority of American courts. In the absence of statute, negotiable instruments have,
in this respect, stood in this country on the same footing with simple
contracts, except in cases in which the bill or note was destroyed or surrendered for the purpose of discharging the debt.' Such was the state
of the law prior to the enactment of the Bills of Exchange Act and the
Negotiable Instruments Law.
The rule as thus developed by the English courts was given statutory force in the Bills of Exchange Act, subject, however, to the qualification that the renunciation "must be in writing, unless the bill is delivered up to the acceptor."'
The author of the Negotiable Instruments Law adopted, in substance, the provision of the Bills of Exchange Act dealing with this
subject. Section 122 of the Law (R. S. Mo. 1909, Sec. 10092) reads as
follows:
"The holder may expressly renounce his rights against any
party to the instrument, before, at or after its maturity. An
absolute and unconditional renunciation of his rights against
the principal debtor made at or after the maturity of the instrument discharges the instrument. But a renunciation
does not affect the rights of a holder in due course without
notice. A renunciation must be in writing unless the instrument is delivered up to the person primarily liable thereon."
2.

Anson on Contract,

Corbin's Ed-

Danielson

(1886)
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Mass. 195, 4 N.

ition, p. 479; Collyer v. Moulton (1868)
9 R. I. 90; Garnsey v. Garnsey (1917)
116 Me. 295, 101 Atl. 447. But see
Robinson v. McFaul, (1854) 19 Mo. 549.
3. Foster v. Dawber (1851) 6 Exch.

". 622;
21 Mo.
(1816)
Lowrey
441, 69

839.
4. Upper San Joachin Irrigating Canal Co. v. Roach (1889) 78 Cal. 552, 21
Pac. 304; Rogers v. Kimball (1898) 121
Cal. 247, 53 Pac. 648; Smith v. Bartholemew (1840) 1 Met. 276; Bragg v.

5. See Law Reports, Statutes, 45 and
46 Victoria, 1882, (Vol. XVIII), p. 383.
Sec. 62 of the B. E. A. reads as follows:
"(1) When' the holder of a bill at or
after its maturity absolutely and unconditionally renounces his rights against

Henderson v. Henderson (1855)
379; Crawford v.
Millspaugh
13 Johns (N. Y.) 87.
See also
v. Danforth (1902) 95 Mo. App.
S. W. 39.
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In the case under review the parties effected what was substantially
a novation. As a part of an oral transaction between plaintiff, defendant, and Lobdell, plaintiff promised to discharge defendant from his obligation as maker of the note, the consideration for this promise being
Lobdell's promise to assume defendant's obligation. Had the N. I. L.
not been in force, the court intimates there would have been a valid discharge. Does the above quoted section of this Act, which requires a
"renunciation" to be in writing, render ineffective the discharge, before
breach, of the maker of a promissory note upon an oral agreement supported by a consideration?
The few courts which have had occasion to pass upon this point
since the adoption of the N. I. L. have answered the question in the affirmative. In Whitcomb v. Nat'l. Exchange Bank of Baltimore,Sa the
defendant, accomodation indorser of a note, claimed that the payee of
the note had orally released him in consideration of certain services performed by him in placing in the hands of the payee bonds as collateral
security for the payment of the note, and resisted plaintiff's claim on the
ground that this provision of the N. I. L. requiring renunciations to be
in writing applied only to renunciations without consideration, and that
therefore he was entitled to submit proof as to an oral agreement based
upon a consideration. The court denied his contention, holding that the
word "renunciation" comprehends the "surrender of a legal right" and
that it not only "appropriately describes the act of surrendering a right
or claim without recompense, but it can be applied with equal propriety
to the relinquishment of a demand upon an agreement supported by a
consideration."
A similar view was taken by the Supreme Court of
Washington in Baldwin v. DalySb the court holding that the word
"renunciation" was used in the sense of a release, and that an accommodation endorser could not be released by an oral agreement, even tho such
6
agreement was supported by a sufficient consideration5c In Pitt v. Little
the same court held that in the absence of a written release of the surthe acceptor the bill is discharged. The
renunciation must be in writing, unless
the bill is delivered up to the acceptor.
(2) The liabilities of any party to a
bill may in like manner be renounced
by the holder before, at, or after its
maturity; but nothing in this section
shall affect the rights of a holder in due
course without notice of the renunciation."
See also Benjamin's Chalmers Bills,
Notes and Checks, 2nd Am. Ed., pp.
245-6.
5a. (1914) 123 Md 612, 91 Atl. 689.

5b. Baldwin v. Daly (1906) 41 Wash.
416, 83 Pac. 724.
5c. The term "renunciation," which
is probably of civil law origin, is used
both by civil law and common law writers to express the general idea of the
surrender of a legal right, without regard to whether the surrender is gratuitous or paid for. Planiol, in his Traite
Elementaire de Droit Civil, Vol. I, p.
889, in discussing the renunciation by a
usufructuary of his right to usufruct,
speaks of renunciations which are paid
for and renunciations which are made
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render of the note, the maker was not released.
presence of a consideration was not so clear.

63

But in that case the

Is there any basis for drawing the distinction suggested between gratuitous renunciations and renunciations supported by a consideration, so
far as the requirement of writing is concerned? Can it be fairly contended that the N. I. L: contemplates a writing only in the case of a renunciation without consideration? It is submitted it cannot.
The obvious purpose of the statutory requirement that a renunciation be in writing is to secure a desirable mode of proof as to one of
the methods of discharging a negotiable instrument. Section 122 of the
N. I. L. deals with discharge by the method of renunciation, and the section provides that discharge by this method must be in writing unless
"the instrument is delivered up to the person primarily liable thereon."
Now if the purpose of the rule is primarily to secure a satisfactory mode
of proof, is there, as a practical matter, substantially any less reason to
require a renunciation for a consideration to be evidenced by a writing,
than to require that a gratuitous renunciation should be so evidenced?
It would seem not.
In this connection one possible source of difficulty should be pointed out. It will be noted that Sec. 119 of the N. I. L. (R. S. Mo. 1909,
Sec. 10089) enumerates the various acts which will discharge a negotiable instrument. It stipulates that "a negotiable instrument is discharged ........................
(4) by any other act which will discharge a simple
contract for the payment of money." So far as Section 119 is concerned, it does not require that any of the "acts" therein mentioned as sufficient to discharge a negotiable instrument be evidenced by a writing.
Now it is, of course, obvious that the oral agreement in the case under
review, supported, as it was, by a consideration, is sufficient to discharge
a simple contract for the payment of money. Why, therefore, cannot
the case be disposed of by Sec. 119, par. 4, of the N. I. L., and judgment given for the defendant? This very point was taken by counsel
in Whitcomb v. Nat'l. Exchange Bank, supra, and ably disposed of by
the court.! The answer is that Section 119 of the Act confines itself to
gratuitously.
Sherman, in Vol. II of
"Roman Law in the Modern World" (pp.
161, 170, 177, 188), in discussing the
various methods by which the different
forms of servitudes may be extinguished, describes "renunciation"
as "the
voluntary surrender of the right of servitude to the owner."
The term is used
in a generic sense, and not in the special sense of the surrender of the right
without compensation.
The term is used in this same generic

sense by common law writers to express the same idea. In Wood's Byles
on Bills and Notes the author, on pp.
199-200, clearly indicates that the term is
applicable to the surrender of a right on
an instrument, whether there be consideration or not. To the same effect, see
Story on Bills, s. 266. See also Gray v.
McCune (1854) 23 Pa. St. 447, at 450.
6. (1910)
58 Wash. 355, 108 Pac.
941.
7. See Whitcomb v. National Ex.
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enumerating certain acts which will operate as a method of discharge;
among these acts is included, by implication, a novation, which, in turn,
involves a renunciation supported by a consideration. Section 122, on
the other hand, deals with renunciation as a method of discharge and
prescribes a mode of proof for such method of discharge. Conceding
that a renunciation for a consideration is one of the acts embraced in
Sec. 119, par. 4, of the Act, must we not then look at Sec. 122, which
deals specifically with renunciation as a method of discharge, for information as to what constitutes an effective renunciation?
For the reasons set forth, it is believed that the oral character of
the rentinciation in the case under review is fatal to the claim of the defendant, and that the court properly so held.
The discussion suggests a question not involved in the case under
review, viz., the status of a written gratuitous renunciation. It is the
generally accepted view that under the Bills of Exchange Act such a
renunciation is good, altho there is little authority directly in point.'
Such a result would, however, seem beyond question. To make renunciation effective, consideration was, as we have seen, unnecessary under the English common law. The Bills of Exchange Act merely adopted the common law rule, adding the requirement that the renunciation
be in writing. It has likewise been generally assumed that the same result follows in this country under the N. I. L.' This assumption is also
doubtless well founded. The English common law rule, which permitted an oral renunciation without consideration, was the rule of the law
merchant," which knew nothing of consideration and which permitted an
oral renunciation. The American courts added to this rule of the law
merchant the common law requirement of a consideration. The English
courts did not. The Bills of Exchange Act has merely added to the rule
of the law merchant a requirement of-a satisfactory method of. proof.
This affords a desirable working rule, permitting the holder to renounce his rights on an instrument without encountering the doctrine
of consideration, and at the same time safeguarding the transaction by a
satisfactory method of proof. It is believed that the N. I. L. should be
so construed as to reach this result.
STANLEY H. UDY."
change Bank (1914)
123 Md. 612, 91
At. 689.
8. Benjamin's Chalmers Bills, Notes
and Checks, 2nd Am. Ed., p. 245-6.
See
also In re George (1890) L. R. 44 Ch.
Div.' 627 and Edwards v. Waiters (1896)

al v. Dew, (1905) 102 App. Div. S29,
92 N. Y. Supp. 891.
10. Story, Promissory Notes, p. 562
(footnote 3, paragraph 2); Woods' Byles
on Bills & Notes, p. 199; Corbin's Anson on Contracts, p. 481.
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9. Williston, Cases on Contracts, Vol.
II. p. 575 (5th paragraph of footnote
beginning p. 574). See also Leask et
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